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ABSTRACT
During the 1990s, market hours in the United States rose dramatically.  The rise in hours occurred
as gross domestic product (GDP) per hour was declining relative to its historical trend, an occurrence
that makes this boom unique, at least for the postwar U.S. economy.  We find that expensed plus
sweat investment was large during this period and critical for understanding the movements in hours
and productivity.  Expensed investments are expenditures that increase future profits but, by national
accounting  rules,  are  treated  as  operating  expenses  rather  than  capital  expenditures.  Sweat
investments are uncompensated hours in a business made with the expectation of realizing capital
gains when the business goes public or is sold.  Incorporating expensed and sweat equity into an
otherwise standard business cycle model, we find that there was rapid technological progress during
the 1990s, causing a boom in market hours and actual productivity.
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edward.prescott@asu.eduDuring the 1990s, market hours in the United States increased dramatically. A possible
explanation for the rise is that the 1990s were a period of rapid technological progress.
But if that were so, then productivity|dened as GDP per hour worked|should have
boomed as well. In fact, productivity fell relative to trend in the decade.1 The question
then is why, unlike in all U.S. postwar booms, did market hours boom in the 1990s while
productivity did not?
One possibility is that some factor other than improvements in production eciency
was responsible for the dramatic increase in hours and the lackluster productivity growth.
Another possibility is simpler, that there is a measurement problem. We nd that at least
the latter is true: there is a problem in measuring output growth, which in turn aects
the measure of productivity growth. The source of this problem is unmeasured intangible
investment, which increased dramatically during the 1990s. We test this hypothesis, and
our test results support it. We nd that properly accounting for these investments changes
the picture of the 1990s dramatically: U.S. productivity did in fact boom along with market
hours during the period.
We focus on two specic types of intangible investment that are not included in the
national accounts. One is expenditures nanced by owners of capital which, by national
accounting rules, is expensed rather than capitalized. Examples of this type include research
and development (R&D), advertising, and investments in building organization capital.
The other type of intangible investment we consider is sweat, investment nanced by
worker-owners who allocate eort and time to their business and receive compensation
at less than their market rate. This type of investment is made with the expectation of
realizing future prots or capital gains when the business goes public or is sold.
There is compelling evidence that both of these types of unmeasured investment were
abnormally high in the 1990s. Rapid technological advancements were being made in in-
dustries that are relatively intensive in producing intangible capital, such as those related
to information technology (IT). According to Doms (2004), two notable pieces of evidence
1 A common misperception is that growth in GDP per hour was high during the 1990s. This misper-
ception is based on high productivity growth rates found in some industries.
1are what was happening to Intel processor speeds, which increased 4.6 percent per month
in the period 1997{2000, and ber optic throughput, which rose from 2.5 gigabits to 400
gigabits per second between 1995 and 2000. In addition, data from the Current Population
Survey of the U.S. Department of Labor show a shift of labor into IT-related and man-
agerial occupations with greater opportunities for business owners to make capital gains
on expensed and sweat investment. Other evidence is the National Science Foundation's
report of R&D investment, which grew 30 percent faster than GDP between 1994 and
2000. R&D investment is expensed and thus lowers corporate prots. Compensation per
hour was also low over this period, suggesting that sweat investment was abnormally high.
Total expensed and sweat investment is not directly measurable, but with the aid
of growth theory, its magnitude can be inferred from U.S. national income and product
account (NIPA) data. Specically, we incorporate expensed and sweat investment into an
otherwise standard growth model, use the extended model to infer the path for intangible
investment, and show why including this type of investment is critical for understand-
ing the dramatic rise in hours in the 1990s. We rst show that a standard one-sector
growth model without intangible investment generates predictions for market hours that
are grossly at odds with U.S. data. We then extend the model by having two technologies
available in the business sector: one for producing nal goods and services and one for
producing intangible capital. We allow the rates of technological progress to dier across
these two technologies, thus allowing for a technology boom in the sector producing in-
tangible capital. Our estimate of net intangible (expensed plus sweat) investment in the
business sector is a little over 0.03 of GDP during the early 1990s and rises to over 0.08 of
GDP at the peak of the boom.
Before we use the model to make predictions about what actually happened to U.S. eco-
nomic activity in the 1990s, we test the model in two ways to check its reliability as a tool
for this economic analysis. One test is a check on the internal consistency of the equi-
librium of our model. We use rst-order conditions of the model and observations from
the NIPA to determine allocations of factor inputs and total factor productivities (TFPs)
across sectors. We then ask, If households in the model economy were confronted with
2these time paths for sectoral TFPs, would the model's behavior be close to the behavior
of the U.S. economy? The answer is yes.
This consistency test imposes a lot of discipline on the model. To demonstrate this,
we consider an alternative hypothesis of what lay behind the hours boom in the 1990s. We
posit that hours rose because of a reduction in labor distortions rather than an increase
in intangible investment. We assume that TFPs in our two sectors change proportionally.
Thus, the number of free parameters with this alternative hypothesis is the same as with
the original. We nd that variations in labor distortions cannot account for the behavior
of the U.S. economy in this period, particularly the boom in hours.
For a second test of our extended model, we compare its prediction for factor incomes
and capital gains to U.S. measures in, respectively, the NIPA and the U.S. Flow of Funds
accounts. This test is demanding because neither the income data nor the capital gains
data were used to infer our measures of sectoral TFPs. Because the incomes reported
in the NIPA data do not include expensed and sweat equity, we need to compare them
to our model's total incomes less intangible investments. The Flow of Funds accounts
report holding gains on assets at market value, which is the change in the asset amount
outstanding less net purchases during the period. We show that the holding gains of
households, subtracting gains for real estate, should move with our model's intangible
gains during the 1990s period. We nd that the model's predictions of both incomes and
gains are in line with U.S. observations.
Because the extended model clearly passes all of our tests of reliability, we can con-
dently use it to get a more accurate picture of the U.S. economy in the late 1990s. In
particular, we use the model to compare current accounting measures for output, invest-
ment, and productivity with analogs that include expensed and sweat investment. Solow's
(1987) remark that \you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity
statistics" is pertinent for our ndings. The model predicts lackluster productivity perfor-
mance if current accounting measures are used and a boom for productivity if expensed
and sweat investments are included. From this, we conclude that ignoring these two types
3of intangible investment gives a distorted picture of the U.S. economy in the 1990s.
The puzzling rise in hours during the 1990s that we attempt to understand here is
not discussed in the business cycle literature. There are at least two reasons for this.
First and foremost, business cycle research has been almost exclusively concerned with the
statistical properties of uctuations and not with individual cycles. That focus can blind
researchers to certain puzzles in the data. Second, there is a common misperception that
labor productivity was high during the hours boom, which would imply that this period is
not puzzling for standard theories. This is certainly not the case for the aggregates: GDP
per hour was below trend for the entire decade. The misperception is based in part on
high growth rates in some industries and in part on the rapid recovery in U.S. business
productivity that began in 1997.
Our ndings show that standard productivity measures grossly understate the actual
rise in labor productivity whether we consider the overall economy or the business sec-
tor. For example, after accounting for intangible investment, we nd that the recovery
in business productivity began earlier and was faster than standard statistics show. Over
the period 1993{2000, the dierence in labor productivity growth due to the inclusion of
intangible investment is 1.2 percent per year. Thus, our analysis deals directly with the
criticism of Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), who argue that intangible investment is \not well
captured by traditional macroeconomic measurement approaches," by which they mean
growth-accounting approaches such as those of Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) and Oliner
and Sichel (2000). Here, we explicitly model the intangible investment and use theory and
data to infer its size.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we review the standard theory and show
that the prediction for hours is inconsistent with U.S. data in the 1990s. In section 2, we
summarize some evidence motivating our extension of the standard theory. The extension,
in section 3, includes expensed and sweat investment. In section 4, we conduct tests of
this extended theory. In section 5, we reevaluate the performance of the U.S. economy in
the 1990s through the lens of the extended theory. Conclusions are in section 6.
41. The Standard Model
We start with the standard growth model used in the study of business cycles. We de-
rive from this model a prediction for hours of work and show that given actual data its
prediction of hours worked in the 1990s is grossly at odds with the fact that U.S. hours
rose dramatically during that period. We investigate the failure of the model and use the
failure to motivate an extension with expensed and sweat equity.
1.1. The Economy
In the standard growth model, given initial capital stock k0, the problem for the stand-in







subject to these constraints:
ct + xt = rtkt + wtht   Tt (1:1)
kt+1 = [(1   )kt + xt]=(1 + ); (1:2)
where variables are written in per capita terms and Nt = N0(1 + )t is the population in
t. Capital is paid rent rt, and labor is paid wage wt. Households discount future utility
at rate , and capital depreciates at rate . The term Tt is the sum of all taxes less all
transfers.
Firms in the economy use the following constant returns technology:
Yt = AtF(Kt;Ht) (1:3)
to produce goods sold to the household. Capital letters in this case denote aggregates. The
parameter At is the technology parameter that varies over time. The rms rent capital and
labor. If prots are maximized, then the rental rates are equal to the marginal products.
If the goods market clears in this economy, then Nt(ct + xt) = Yt. Here, c includes
both private and public consumption and x includes both private and public investment.
51.2. The Intratemporal Condition
At an optimum, household decisions satisfy the intratemporal rst-order condition equating
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and the after-tax real
wage. Let ct be the tax rate on consumption, and let ht be the tax rate on wage income
wtht. If the utility and production functions are2
U(c;h) = logc +   log(1   h)
F(K;H) = KH1 ;
then the household's intratemporal condition is
 (1 + ct)ct
1   ht




where yt is per capita output. Only current period variables enter this relation.
1.3. A Bad Prediction
The household's intratemporal condition is the key equation for the model's prediction for
hours of work. We use it and relevant data for the 1990s to make that prediction.
From the U.S. national accounts, we have data for total consumption of services and
nondurables c, gross domestic product y, and the tax receipts needed to estimate tax rate

















We use (1:5) to compare this predicted series to the actual hours of work per capita.4
In Figure 1, we plot this model's predicted per capita hours of work along with the
U.S. actual, indexed so that 1990 equals 100. The dierence between the series is striking.
2 These functional form assumptions are standard in the business cycle literature.
3 The sources of national account data that we use are the Board of Governors (1945{2005) and
the U.S. Department of Commerce (1929{2005). See Appendix A for more details. Tax rates are
estimated as in Prescott (2004).
4 The source of hours and population is the Current Population Survey and is described in detail by
Prescott, Ueberfeldt, and Cociuba (2005). We set  = 0:34 and   = 1:33, but the results are not
sensitive to these choices.
6Actual hours per capita rose 8 percent between 1992 and 1999, more than 1 percent per
year. The predicted series actually falls during this period, primarily because of a rise in
the tax on wage income ht. To account for an 8 percent rise in hours in (1:5), that tax
rate would have had to fall 5 percentage points.
Why is the prediction for hours worked so bad? Since the prediction is derived from the
household's intratemporal condition, another way of asking this question is, Why is there
such a large deviation in the condition during the 1990s?5 We turn next to evidence that
suggests that the large deviation is due to the fact that we are using the wrong measure
of output. Unmeasured intangible investment was abnormally large during this period.
Standard measures of output growth are distorted when the importance of intangible
investments grows, which can potentially explain why measured labor productivity was
low at the same time that rapid technological advancements were being made. If true
output (in (1:5)) is understated by GDP, then predicted hours will be too low.
2. Evidence of Increased Intangible Investment
We present two types of evidence that the unmeasured intangible investment was abnor-
mally large during the 1990s. One type of evidence is related to the behavior of NIPA
compensation and prots; the other, to the technology boom going on during the period.
Because intangible investments are expensed in the NIPA, measurements of factor incomes
are understated to a greater extent in periods when these investments are high. We show
that that was true for the 1990s. We then present evidence that, during the technology
boom, the level of investment was indeed high and led to large capital gains that are missed
by the NIPA's income measure.
2.1. Low Compensation and Corporate Prots
If all incomes were included in the national accounts, we'd expect to see compensation
5 There is also a deviation in the condition relating the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion today and tomorrow and the marginal rate of transformation. But this intertemporal deviation
is small in comparison to the intratemporal deviation.
7and prots rise during a boom. The U.S. national accounts reveal that compensation and
prots were low during the boom period, suggesting that unmeasured expensed and sweat
investment was abnormally high.
In Figure 2, we plot average weekly hours of work for the noninstitutional population,
aged 16 to 64 (the same number of hours as those in Figure 1). We also plot the wage rate
corresponding to these hours, which is computed as follows. We take NIPA compensation
and deate it by the GDP deator. We then detrend for population growth by dividing
real compensation by this population. Finally, because there is technological growth, we
divide the wage rate by the factor 1:02t, where t indexes time. For all of the 1990s, NIPA
real, detrended compensation per hour is below the 1990 level, despite the fact that there
was a boom in hours.6
In Figure 3, we compare NIPA GDP and corporate prots, both deated by the GDP
deator and detrended so that they do not grow with population or technology. We see
that prots fall (relative to trend) in the late 1990s when GDP, R&D, and capital gains
are high.
2.2. The Technology Boom
Although lower income is indirect evidence of increased expensed and sweat investment,
there is also some direct evidence available related to the technology boom. The 1990s were
a period of rapid technological advances. Companies were increasing R&D and the payos
were evident in increased IPOs and mergers and acquisitions. There is also direct evidence
that most of the rise in hours was concentrated in activities related to the technology
boom.
One indicator of increased intangible investment is increased funding of R&D, which
is expensed by corporations. The National Science Foundation (NSF) (1953{2003) reports
that industry R&D increased 68 percent between 1994 and 2000, while GDP rose only 39
6 In earlier work (McGrattan and Prescott 2005b), we abstract from sweat equity and treat NIPA
compensation as true labor income. Doing so reduces the estimate of total intangible investment in
both expensed and sweat equity.
8percent. The NSF includes in this measure expenses for wages and salaries, fringe benets
for R&D personnel, materials and supplies, property and other taxes, maintenance and
repairs depreciation, and an appropriate share of overhead. The NSF also reports that
a signicant fraction of the company-funded R&D is done by companies in information
technology (IT) industries.
Another indicator of abnormally large intangible investment is the dramatic increase
in IPOs and mergers and acquisitions. According to data from the Thomson Financial
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database (also available in Ritter and Welch 2002,
Table 1), gross proceeds from IPOs were signicantly higher in the 1990s than in the
1980s. Gross proceeds of IPOs averaged $8.2 billion over the period 1980{89 and $30.9
billion over the period 1990{99. Large increases in the value of existing equity, and therefore
large capital gains, are typically associated with IPOs. Because these gains are not included
in NIPA, NIPA incomes understate true income. Other related evidence available from the
SDC database is the volume of announced mergers and acquisitions. The volume rose from
$0.6 trillion in 1994 to $3.4 trillion by 2000. As in the case of IPOs, the accrued capital
gains are not included in NIPA measures of income.
The evidence presented thus far suggests that during the 1990s boom, business owners
made large unmeasured investments and made large gains on those investments. If that is
true, then we should see the rise in hours concentrated in certain groups of occupations.
Using Current Population Survey (CPS) data, we nd that the large increase in hours is,
in fact, concentrated among a small group of occupations.7 According to the survey data,
per capita hours for the entire noninstitutional population aged 16 to 64 rose 6.5 percent
between 1992 and 2000. Half of this increase was due to hours worked of those with at least
one year of college education in a select set of occupations. These occupations include most
managers and proprietors, computer analysts, and certain nancial occupations involved
with IPOs and mergers and acquisitions.8 Our aim here is to focus on occupations in
7 Here, we are referring to data compiled from the March supplement of the CPS survey. See
www.ipums.org for more details (Ruggles et al. 2004).
8 Specically, using data from IPUMS (www.ipums.org, Ruggles et al. 2004), we split workers into two
groups: those with variable EDUCREC greater than or equal to 8 and variable OCC in the set f4,
9which many workers make large unmeasured investments. Hours of the educated in these
occupations accounted for only 10.3 percent of the hours in 1992, but rose 30 percent
between 1992 and 2000. This change in hours contributed half of the overall change in
hours.
In summary, we nd compelling evidence that intangible investment was abnormally
high during the 1990s. This motivates an extension of the standard model with both
tangible and intangible investment and a reevaluation of the predictions of growth theory
for the U.S. economy during this period.
3. Our Extended Model
We now modify the standard growth model by extending it to include intangible invest-
ment. Intangible investments are made by businesses, so we distinguish business and
non-business activity. We start by describing the technology available to businesses, the
optimal business size, and the aggregate production technology. The household problem
remains the same except for an additional investment choice. We examine the model's
prediction for hours and show that the extended model accounts for the puzzling U.S. ob-
servations during the 1990s.
3.1. Extensions










Firms produce yb, which is business output, using their intangible capital kI, tangible
capital k1
T, and labor h1. Firms produce intangible capital|such as new brands, new
products R&D, patents, etc.|using intangible capital kI, tangible capital k2
T, and labor
7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 18, 21, 22, 34, 37, 64, 65, 229, 23, 24, 25, 225g and the remainder.
10h2. Note that kI is an input to both business sectors; it is not split between them as is the
case for tangible capital and labor. The aggregation theory underlying this technology is
developed in Appendix B.




t[logct +   log(1   ht)]Nt
subject to
ct + xTt + qtxIt = rTtkTt + rItkIt + wtht + t
  ctct   ht(wtht   (1   )qtxIt)   ktkTt   xtxTt
  ptfrTtkTt + rItkIt   TkTt   qtxIt   ktkTtg
  dtfrTtkTt + rItkIt   xTt   qtxIt   ktkTt
  pt(rTtkTt + rItkIt   TkTt   qtxIt   ktkTt)   xtxTtg
kTt+1 = [(1   T)kTt + xTt]=(1 + ) (3:3)
kIt+1 = [(1   I)kIt + xIt]=(1 + ): (3:4)
As before, all variables are in per capita units and there is growth in population at rate .
Consumption c includes both private and public consumption, and tangible investment xT
includes both private and public investment. The relative price of intangible investment
and consumption is q. The rental rates for business tangible and intangible capital are
denoted by rT and rI, respectively, and the wage rate for labor is denoted by w. Inputs
are paid their marginal products. Other income is denoted by  and is exogenous in
the household's decision problem. Other income includes government transfers and non-
business capital income net of taxes and investment. Non-business labor income is included
in wh.
We treat hours  hn, investment  xn, and output  yn in the non-business sector ex-
ogenously because this sector is quite small compared to the business sector and is not
important for the issues being addressed. Doing this makes the exposition of the model
much clearer. We simply set the levels of non-business hours, investment, and output
11equal to U.S. levels. Measured output ym, which corresponds to GDP, is the sum of yb
and  yn. Measured tangible investment xm is the sum of business tangible investment xT
and non-business tangible investment  xn. Measured hours h is the sum of business hours
h1 + h2 and non-business hours  hn.
The tax system in the model economy mimics the U.S. system. It includes taxes on
consumption c, measured wages h, tangible capital (that is, property) k, investment x,
prots p, and distributions d. Let  denote the fraction of intangible investment nanced
by capital owners.9 The amount qtxIt is expensed investment, nanced by the capital
owners who have lower prots with increases in this type of investment. The amount
(1   )qtxIt is sweat investment, nanced by workers who have lower compensation with
increases in this type of investment.
Gross domestic product in the economy is the sum of total consumption (public plus
private) and tangible investment (public plus private) for business and non-business; in
per capita terms GDP is ymt = ct + xTt +  xnt. Gross domestic income (GDI) is the sum
of labor income less sweat investment wtht  (1   )qtxIt, business capital income less
expensed investment, rTtkTt+ rItkIt  qtxIt, and non-business capital income (which is
found residually as the dierence between GDP and the other components of GDI).
3.2. Predictions for Hours
We showed that a key failure with the standard theory was evident in the intratemporal
condition (1:4), the predictions of which are inconsistent with U.S. data. The extended
model with intangible investment has an analogous intratemporal condition, but labor
productivity in this model must be measured dierently. Therefore, we show the extended
model has the potential to resolve the puzzling movements in hours and productivity during
the 1990s.
9 The choice is irrelevant without taxes. With taxes, the choice is all or none without risk which might
optimally be shared between capital owners and worker-owners.
12To see that, consider the intratemporal condition for the extended model, which is
 (1 + ct)ct
1   ht







where ht = h1
t + h2
t +  hnt and  = 1 + 1. Note that the real wage rate in the standard
model is proportional to the standard denition of labor productivity, output of nal
goods and services divided by total hours. In the extended model, however, hours are
split between two dierent types of activities. The real wage rate to labor producing nal
goods and services is proportional to the labor productivity given by ybt=h1
t. This ratio is
larger than measured business output ybt divided by total business labor input h1
t +h2
t. As
more time is allocated to the accumulation of intangible investment (h2
t increasing), the
understatement of true wages becomes more severe.10
We use (3:5) to determine how large h2
t would have to be in order for (3:5) to hold.















(1   ht) (3:6)
h2
t = ht   h1
t    hnt: (3:7)
Using observations on business value-added, consumption, total hours, non-business hours,
and tax rates, we can directly infer the allocation of hours to production of nal goods and
services and to production of new intangible capital. In Figure 4, we plot the ratio h2
t=ht,
which represents the fraction of hours devoted to producing intangible capital. These data
are based on our model's expressions (3:6) and (3:7) with  = 0:34 and   = 1:33 and
on U.S. data on tax rates, consumption, business value-added, and total hours. Clearly
these hours would have had to increase dramatically, starting in 1992. The fraction h2
t=ht
consistent with U.S. data rises from 2.7 percent to 7.7 percent by 2000.
If hours devoted to producing intangible capital rose as in Figure 4, then there is no
deviation in the intratemporal condition (3:5). What caused this large increase in hours,
10 In standard sticky wage models, the condition (1:4) is replaced by a dynamic equation relating the
nominal wage to a markup over expected future marginal rates of substitution between consumption
and leisure. As McGrattan (2005) shows, however, the impact of monetary shocks in these models
is tiny. Given the magnitude of these shocks for the United States during the 1990s, these models
cannot account for the dramatic rise in hours and output.
13especially hours devoted to building intangible capital? The evidence presented earlier
suggests that advances in technology that were particularly large in certain activities could
have generated the increase. Next, we test this hypothesis in the context of our extended
model.
4. Testing of Extended Model
Before we use the extended model to analyze the 1990s, we test it to see if it has the
potential to resolve the puzzle of the 1990s. We put the model to two tests, and it passes
them both.
One test is a check on the consistency of the model's equilibrium. We use a subset
of equilibrium relations for the model to infer sequences for sectoral TFPs. Treating these
sequences as exogenous, we compute the equilibrium path and compare it with U.S. data.
The match between the two sets of time series is close. Thus, the model does extremely
well on this test.
The other test is more demanding. We compare predictions of the model to obser-
vations that were not used when we inferred paths for sectoral TFPs. In particular, we
compare the model's predictions for factor incomes and capital gains to analogs in the
U.S. data. The model passes this test as well.
4.1. First Steps
Two steps are needed in order to conduct the tests. We have to revise the national accounts
to be consistent with our extended model, and we have to choose the model's parameters.
4.1.1. Revising Data
We start with the tedious but essential step of revising the national accounts to make them
consistent with our model. Four adjustments are necessary. We provide an overview of
the process here and details in Appendix A.
14Consumption Taxes. Unlike the NIPA, our model output does not include consump-
tion taxes as part of consumption and as part of value-added. We thus subtract sales and
excise taxes from the NIPA data on taxes on production and imports and from personal
consumption expenditures. As a result, unlike the NIPA, our data use producer prices
rather than a mixture of producer and consumer prices.
Financial Services. We treat some of the NIPA's nancial services as intermediate
rather than as nal and subtract them from GDP and from consumption services. Speci-
cally, we subtract personal business expenses for handling life insurance and pension plans
from net interest and from personal consumption expenditures.
Fixed Asset Expenditures. We treat expenditures on all xed assets as investment.
Thus, spending on consumer durables is treated as an investment rather than as a con-
sumption expenditure. We introduce a consumer durables services sector in much the
same way as the NIPA introduces owner-occupied housing services. Households rent the
consumer durables to themselves. A related adjustment is made for government capital.
Intangible Investment. Our output measure includes intangible investment. Thus,
total product in the model is the sum of intangible investment and gross domestic product
(which is the same concept as the NIPA's GDP after the adjustments are made for con-
sumption taxes, intermediate nancial services, and consumer durables). On the income
side of our extended model accounts, we add capital gains qtxIt. Fraction  of capital
gains is allocated to compensation, and fraction 1    to prots.
4.1.2. Setting Parameters
Next, we need to choose parameters for the extended model. Here, we report and motivate
our choices.
For interest and growth rates, we use estimates based on U.S. trends. In particular,
we set the interest rate at 4.1 percent and the annual growth in population at 1 percent
( = :01). We also assume that technology grows over time in the economy, so that per
capita GDP and its components grow at 2 percent annually. These choices imply that
15 = :98.
Household preferences depend on the parameter  . As we did earlier, in the standard
model, here we choose   = 1:33 in order to match data for the fraction of time allocated to
work (in U.S. business and non-business activities). This value implies that 27.5 percent
of discretionary time is allocated to work.
Since changes in tax rates on capital were modest during the 1990s, we hold these
constant. We set the prots tax rate p = 0:35 because most of the taxes on prots are
corporate income taxes. We set the distribution tax d = 0:15, which is slightly less than
our estimate in earlier work (McGrattan and Prescott 2005a) for corporate distributions;
this is appropriate because noncorporate taxes are not taxed twice. We set the tax on
investment x = 0 because depreciation allowances, investment tax credits, and investment
taxes were negligible in the 1990s. Finally, we set the property tax rate k = 0:016, which
is consistent with the NIPA non-sales taxes on production and imports.
We use the same series for the tax on consumption that we used in the standard
model. But for the tax on labor h, we need to make one adjustment. Since we want
to assume that h is the tax rate on labor income excluding capital gains, we can either
subtract the capital gains tax receipts from receipts or add capital gains income to taxable
income before constructing our estimate of the tax rate. We do the latter because the
income data are available from the U.S. Department of Commerce.11
The share parameters and depreciation rates are chosen so that 1990 in the model
simulations looked like 1990 in U.S. time series.12 U.S. corporate and noncorporate business
accounts for 75 percent of value-added. The remaining sector, the non-business sector,
includes U.S. households, nonprots, and government.13
We use the same input elasticities for producing both nal goods and intangible capi-
11 We add capital gains income to taxable income using data reported by the BEA in the table comparing
NIPA personal income and the IRS's adjusted gross income.
12 There is no way to determine I. We chose 0 and experimented with other values to make sure our
main results did not change.
13 In Appendix A, we show specically how we categorize business and non-business activity for U.S. na-
tional accounts.
16tal. When we match the extended model and data for 1990, we nd that 1 = 2 = 0:254,
1 = 2 = 0:087, and m = 0:04 for the business sector technologies.
The nal parameter to be set is , the fraction of intangible investment that is nanced
by capital owners. As noted earlier, the only real ramication of this choice is for tax
payments. But the evidence in Figures 2 and 3 indicates that some investment is being
done by both shareholders and workers. We chose  = 0:5 and then experimented with




The rst test of our extended model is to ask, Are there paths of sectoral TFPs fA1
t;A2
tg
that imply an equilibrium of the model that is consistent with U.S. observations? If the
answer is no, then this model is not useful for predicting what was happening during the
1990s U.S. boom. If the answer is yes, then it may be. We nd that the model is potentially
useful for predicting the size of intangible investments and the patterns of actual output
per hour.
Test Results. Above we showed that the intratemporal condition relating the marginal
rate of substitution to the after-tax wage rate gives us an expression for sectoral hours in
terms of U.S. observations. If we had observations on all investment and capital stocks, we
could use (3:1) and (3:2) to nd total factor productivity (TFP) for the two technologies,
feed these TFPs into the model, and compute equilibrium responses of the household.
However, we do not have observations on all investments and capital. So, we must
use additional equilibrium relations to determine the sequences of TFP. In Appendix C,
we describe the steps used to derive sequences for A1
t and A2
t. The main idea is to equate
returns to capital in order to determine the sectoral allocation of capital stocks. The
resulting sequences for TFPs are plotted in Figure 5 along with the standard measure of
17TFP: GDP divided by K0:33
mt H0:67
t , where Kmt is total measured capital and Ht is total
hours. All series are real and relative to trend.
In the gure, the three curves are quite dierent. The standard TFP measure falls
slightly over the period, but stays close to trend. The implied TFPs for the model with
intangible investment show large increases. In the sector producing nal goods and services,
the increase is about 6 percent. In the sector producing intangible capital, the increase is
close to 17 percent.
We now examine U.S. data through the lens of the extended model, with intangible
investment. We compute the model's equilibrium for the TFP series in Figure 5 along with
the varying tax rates on market wages and consumption discussed above. In Figure 6, we
display the results for per capita total hours worked. Unlike the comparable gure with the
standard model's predictions (Figure 1), here, the predictions and the actual series track
each other closely. The extended model predicts that hours used to produce nal goods
and services actually fall below trend somewhat in the 1990s. But because hours spent
building intangible capital rise signicantly, the model predicts a large overall increase in
hours | which is what the data actually show.
The model and data paths for labor productivity in the business sector are also close.
We plot these paths in Figure 7. The model's prediction for business value-added tracks
the actual NIPA series closely, so its prediction for labor productivity does too. We nd
as well a close match for total labor productivity (GDP per hour).
There is a modest dierence in the model and data paths of tangible investment.
These series are plotted in Figure 8. The model prediction is sensitive to the choice of
capital taxation, which is xed over the period. However, even with the assumption of
constant capital taxes, the model does well predicting the pattern, the rise and fall, of
tangible investment.
Test Strength. If TFPs are determined from rst-order conditions of the household's
problem, is the consistency test much of a test? Here we consider an alternative version
of the extended model that has the same number of free parameters as the model with
18dierent TFPs in producing nal goods and intangible capital. The alternative has TFPs
in (3:1) and (3:2) varying proportionally and ht chosen to satisfy the intratemporal rst-
order condition. The hypothesis underlying this alternative version is that the boom in
market hours is caused by a large reduction in labor distortions. Despite the fact that
there are the same number of free parameters as in the original version of the extended
model, we nd that the alternative with reduced labor distortions is grossly at odds with
U.S. data.
To see this, rst note that labor productivities are equated in equilibrium. Thus, the
intratemporal condition can be written as
 (1 + ct)ct
1   ht
= (1   ht)(1   )





Here, the relative price q is xed because TFPs are assumed to vary proportionally. Equa-
tion (4:1) has two unobserved variables: ht and xIt. We can use (4:1) along with the
intertemporal condition relating the marginal rate of substitution of consumption this pe-
riod and next to the return on intangible capital in order to determine sequences of ht
and xIt.
The resulting sequences oscillate wildly. For example, the series for the labor distortion
oscillates between 0 percent and 40 percent and displays little persistence. Such a pattern
is inconsistent with the notion of reduced labor distortions and cannot generate an hours
boom unless movements in capital tax rates and TFP are also oscillatory and osetting.
We conclude that our consistency test is a strong test. This gives us a considerable
degree of condence in the hypothesis that increased growth in TFPs, especially in the
sector producing intangible capital, resolves the puzzling U.S. observations during the
1990s. The next test builds our condence further.
4.2.2. External Accuracy
Thus far, we have checked on the extended model's internal consistency using TFP se-
quences derived from the model's equilibrium relations. Now we consider a more demand-
ing test, comparing model predictions to observations not used to infer the TFP paths.
19In particular, we explore predictions for business wage compensation as measured in the
NIPA and for business capital gains as measured in the Flow of Funds accounts. Neither
series was used to derive our measures of TFPs. We nd that the model predicts these
series remarkably well.
To compare the model's prediction for NIPA wage compensation in the business sector,
we need to construct wages as a national accountant would. Such an accountant, placed in
the model economy, would estimate wage compensation in the business sector as wt(h1
t +
h2
t)  (1 )qtxIt, in eect, subtracting part of intangible capital, the value of sweat equity.
In Figure 9, we plot this predicted series along with the actual U.S. series. Both are real
series, detrended by 2 percent annually, and set equal to 100 in 1990. The two are fairly
close. Relative to the 1990 trend level, both the model prediction and the actual wages
are up nearly 8 percent in 2000. We should note that our choice of  = 0:5 is relevant
for this prediction. The value of  determines the level of taxation on expensed versus
sweat equity, which aects the equilibrium measured compensation. Higher values of 
increase the predicted value of compensation. Allowing for variation in  would imply a
better t of these curves. However, we do not have independent evidence of the nancing
of expensed and sweat equity.
Next, we compare the model's predictions for estimates of the increase in capital gains
from expensed and sweat equity to U.S. household holding gains reported in the Flow of
Funds accounts. Those gains are the change in the value of assets outstanding (taken
from Table L.100) less the net purchases during the period (taken from Table F.100). If
Flow of Funds accountants recorded holding gains for our model households, they would
compute dierences in the total value of businesses (for which the household is the residual
claimant). The value of all businesses in t, Vt, is composed of two parts:
Vt = (1   dt)(1 + xt)KT;t+1 + [(1   dt)(1   pt) + (1   )(1   ht)]qtKI;t+1; (4:2)
where capital letters denote aggregates. On the right side of (4:2), the rst term is the
value of tangible capital, and the second, the value of intangible capital. Notice that the
price of intangible capital depends on , since income to capital and income to labor are
taxed dierently.
20The change in the value V of businesses does not exactly reect the additional income
in the model economy. The additional income is qtXIt (in units of the nal goods and
services). However, during periods with large investments of intangible capital, the increase
in holding gains, as dened in the Flow of Funds accounts, is a good approximation to the
increase in intangible investment.
In Figure 10, we plot an estimate of U.S. real holding gains relative to GDP, using
data from the Flow of Funds accounts and the NIPA. To illustrate that the late 1990s and
early 2000s were special, we show the estimates annually back to 1953. The gure reveals
a signicant break in the series in 1995. Before that year, the series averages around 6
percent of GDP. In 1995 and thereafter, the average is 12 percent. A dierence of 6 percent
of GDP is large.
Because our theory does not provide an explanation for the huge swings in asset
prices, we compare the model's predicted gains with the U.S. averages. We also have to
make an adjustment for foreign gains because our model includes only domestic sectors.
Since many domestic corporations have foreign subsidiaries, the value of U.S. corporations
includes equity from foreign capital, and the holding gains include gains from this foreign
capital. We estimate the gains by assuming that the ratio of after-tax foreign corporate
prots (excluding gains) to after-tax domestic corporate prots (excluding gains) is equal
to the ratio of foreign to domestic holding gains. With this assumption, our estimate of
foreign gains relative to total gains is approximately 23 percent on average for the period
1990{2003.
In Figure 11, we show again the U.S. actual average real holding gains along with the
extended model's prediction for them. Both curves rise signicantly in the late 1990s. The
rise is coincident with the dramatic rise in hours. We thus conclude that the model passes
this demanding test.
We can now report with condence the predictions of the extended model for the
macroeconomy during the 1990s.
215. Predictions for the U.S. Macroeconomy
What does all of this mean for U.S. output, productivity, and investment? If some output
is unmeasured relative to inputs, then GDP and productivity estimates are biased down-
ward. If the mismeasurement is intangible investment, then the investment estimates are
also biased downward. Our extended model's predictions for variables with and without
intangible investment demonstrate how distorted standard data and models have been.
In Figure 12, we compare two predictions for output, both computed from the ex-
tended model. One is the model's prediction for gross domestic product, which includes
consumption and tangible investment but not intangible investment. The other prediction
is for what we will call total output, which is GDP plus intangible investment qtxIt. Both
series are detrended by 2 percent annually and set equal to 100 in 1990. Comparison of
the predictions shows GDP growing slightly faster than 2 percent per year between 1991
and 1997. But total output takes o starting in 1994. At its peak, in 1999, total output
was far above its 1990 trend, whereas GDP was only slightly higher than its trend.
In Figure 13, we show the same sort of comparison for business labor productivity:
business value-added | with and without intangible investment | divided by total busi-
ness hours. Again, both measures are detrended by 2 percent annually and set equal to
100 in 1990. Notice how dierent the predictions are. Measured labor productivity, which
is what national accountants would record if put into the economy, shows a signicant fall
relative to trend up to 1997 and then a sharp increase through 2000. But total productiv-
ity, including intangible investment, fell only until 1993 and then, starting in 1994, grew
very quickly. Over the period 1993{2000, the dierence in growth rates for these two series
is 1.2 percent per year.
In Figure 14, we compare the model's two measures of total investment: tangible in-
vestment and tangible plus intangible investment. Again, both are detrended by 2 percent
annually and normalized to 100 in 1990. And again, the predictions|with and without
intangible investment|are very dierent. Between 1991 and 1999, tangible investment
alone rose almost 20 percent. Total investment, however, rose more than 30 percent.
22Finally, in Figure 15, we display intangible investment as a share of total output, by
which we mean GDP plus intangible investment. This gure displays the bottom line of
our study, that the value of this investment is large and increased signicantly in the 1990s.
That is precisely what we see in Figure 15. We can, hence, say with some condence that
because the standard accounting measures and models do not take account of intangible
investment, they do not accurately reect what was going on in the U.S. economy during
this period.
6. Conclusion
Why did U.S. market hours boom in the 1990s while productivity didn't? The answer is
clear when attention expands beyond standard measures of output. Standard measures
of output do not include a type of investment that rose signicantly in the 1990s: intan-
gible investment. In McGrattan and Prescott (2005a), we found that intangible capital
was important for estimating the value of corporate equity. Here, we have considered
its impact on hours, output, and productivity. To do this, we have modied a standard
growth model by extending it to include intangible investment. Using data for the United
States and our extended model, we conclude that intangible investment was a large con-
tributor to the U.S. hours boom of the 1990s. Measurements of productivity based on
these types of investment show that productivity boomed along with hours in the 1990s.
More far-reaching is the implication of our work: ignoring this investment in the data and
in the standard growth model has clearly produced a distorted view of the performance
of the U.S. economy|and will continue to do so whenever intangible investment changes
signicantly.
23Appendix A. Adjusting the National Accounts
In this appendix, we describe in more detail the adjustments that are made to the national
accounts so that they are consistent with our theory.
In Table A1, we display the components of our measure of domestic business value-
added. This measure is close to, but not exactly the same as, the sum of the value-added
of corporate business, sole proprietorships and partnerships, and other private business
as dened in the NIPA tables. In our table, we note the source of these NIPA series.
Two adjustments, made in lines 20 and 25, together imply that our estimate of domestic
business value-added is lower than NIPA's by an amount equal to 0.049 of GDP. The rst
adjustment (line 20) removes the personal business expense for handling life insurance and
pension plans from net interest. We treat these nancial services included in NIPA as
intermediate rather than as nal. The second adjustment (line 25) removes sales tax from
taxes on production and imports. Our model's output does not include consumption taxes
as part of consumption or as part of value-added, but the BEA does.
In Table A2, we display the components of our measure of domestic non-business
value-added. This measure is close to, but not exactly the same as, the sum of value-
added of households, nonprots, general government, and government enterprises. Three
adjustments are made. We add depreciation of consumer durables (line 5), subtract sales
taxes (line 24), and add imputed capital services for consumer durables and government
capital (line 25). Adjustments for consumer durables are necessary because we include
consumer durables with investment while the BEA includes durables with consumption.
Services for government capital are included because the BEA does not impute any value
to them. We assume a rate of return equal to 4.1 percent, which is an estimate of the
return on other types of capital.
In Table A3, we construct our measure of gross domestic product. The adjustments
noted above are also included in product, so that income and product balance. We have also
categorized tangible investment into business and non-business as in the case of incomes.
That is, investments of corporations and noncorporate business are included with business
24investment, and investments of households, nonprots, and government are included with
non-business investment.
To be consistent, we also categorize hours from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
as business or non-business. Using the March supplement (through www.ipums.org), we
construct business hours as the sum of hours for the self-employed|both incorporated and
unincorporated|and hours for private wage and salary workers less hours for employees
in nonprots. Because private wage and salary workers include employees at nonprots,
we use BEA data on compensation in nonprots, and assuming an average wage rate equal
to the economy-wide average, we can infer hours for nonprots. Hours in the non-business
sector are found by subtracting business hours from the total. We use the hours from the
March supplement sample to compute the fractions of hours in business and non-business.
For our nal series, we multiply these fractions by total hours in the monthly CPS sample.
25Table A. Revised National Accounts, Averages Relative to GDP, 1990{2003
A1. Domestic Business Value-Added
1 Domestic Business Value-Added .700
2 Consumption of xed capital .082
3 Corporate business (NIPA 7.5) .067
4 Sole proprietorships and partnerships (NIPA 7.5) .013
5 Other private business (NIPA 7.5) .003
6 Labor Income .469
7 Compensation of employees .421
8 Corporate business (NIPA 1.13) .382
9 Sole proprietorships and partnerships (NIPA 1.13) .036
10 Other private business (NIPA 1.13) .002
11 70% Proprietors' income with IVA and CCadj (NIPA 1.13) .049
12 Capital Income .149
13 Corporate prots with IVA and CCadj (NIPA 1.13) .073
14 30% Proprietors' income with IVA and CCadj (NIPA 1.13) .021
15 Rental income of persons with CCadj (NIPA 1.13) .006
16 Net interest and miscellaneous payments .022
17 Corporate business (NIPA 1.13) .014
18 Sole proprietorships and partnerships (NIPA 1.13) .012
19 Other private business (NIPA 1.13) .005
20 Less: Intermediate nancial servicesa (NIPA 2.5.5) .009
21 Taxes on production and importsb .026
22 Corporate business (NIPA 1.13) .056
23 Sole proprietorships and partnerships (NIPA 1.13) .008
24 Other private business (NIPA 1.13) .002
25 Less: Sales tax (NIPA 3.5) .040
See footnotes at the end of the table.
26Table A. Revised National Accounts (Cont.)
A2. Domestic Non-business Value-Added
1 Domestic Non-business Value-Added .337
2 Consumption of xed capital .099
3 Households .084
4 Excluding consumer durables (NIPA 7.5) .012
5 Consumer durable depreciation (FOF F10) .062
6 Nonprots (NIPA 7.5) .004
7 General government (NIPA 7.5) .018
8 Government enterprises (NIPA 7.5) .003
9 Labor Income .154
10 Compensation of employees .154
11 Households (NIPA 1.13) .001
12 Nonprots (NIPA 1.13) .042
13 General government (NIPA 1.13) .099
14 Government enterprises (NIPA 1.13) .012
15 Capital Income .083
16 Current surplus of government enterprises (NIPA 1.13) .001
17 Rental income of persons with CCadj (NIPA 1.13) .008
18 Net interest and miscellaneous payments .033
19 Households (NIPA 1.13) .031
20 Nonprots (NIPA 1.13) .002
21 Taxes on production and importsb .004
22 Households (NIPA 1.13) .011
23 Nonprots (NIPA 1.13) .001
24 Less: Sales tax (NIPA 3.5) .007
25 Imputed capital servicesc .038
26 Household, consumer durables .013
27 Government capital .025
See footnotes at the end of the table.
27Table A. Revised National Accounts (Cont.)
A3. Domestic Value-Added and Product
1 Total Adjusted Domestic Income 1.043
2 Domestic Business Value-Added .700
3 Domestic Non-business Value-Added .337
4 Statistical Discrepancy .006
5 Total Adjusted Domestic Product 1.043
6 Private consumption .618
7 Personal consumption expenditures (NIPA 1.1.5) .678
8 Less: Consumer durables (NIPA 1.1.5) .083
9 Less: Intermediate nancial servicesa (NIPA 2.5.5) .009
10 Less: Sales tax, nondurables and services (NIPA 3.5) .042
11 Consumer durable depreciation (FOF F10) .062
12 Imputed capital servicesc .013
13 Public consumption (NIPA 3.1) .179
14 Government consumption expenditures (NIPA 3.1) .154
15 Imputed capital servicesc .025
16 Business tangible investmentd .112
17 Corporate gross private domestic investment (FOF F6) .092
18 Noncorporate gross private domestic investment (FOF F6) .020
19 Non-business tangible investment .134
20 Household .114
21 Excluding consumer durables (FOF F6) .036
22 Consumer durables (NIPA 1.1.5) .083
23 Less: Sales tax, durables (NIPA 3.5) .005
24 Nonprots (FOF F6) .007
25 Government investment (NIPA 3.1) .033
26 Net exports of goods and services (NIPA 1.1.5)  :021
NOTE: IVA, inventory valuation adjustment; CCadj, capital consumption adjustment.
a Expense is for handling life insurance and pension plans.
b This category includes business transfers and excludes subsidies. c Imputed capital services are equal to 4.1 percent times the current-cost net stock of government xed
assets and consumer durables goods.
d Ten percent of farm business is in corporate, with the remainder in noncorporate.
28Appendix B. Aggregation in Extended Model
Here we develop the aggregation theory underlying the technology of our extended model.
(See Section 3.)
A business is characterized by the stock of its (unmeasured) intangible capital, KI.
This capital can be used for two activities. One activity produces the composite output of
the business Yb, and the other produces intangible investment goods XI.
Inputs of (measured) tangible capital Ki
T and hours Hi along with KI produce an
intermediate good Zi via a standard constant returns to scale neoclassical production




I (Hi)1 i i; i 2 f1;2g:
The quantity of Yb produced is g1(Z1), and the quantity of XI produced is g2(Z2): The
functions gi are increasing, initially strictly convex, then strictly concave, and they satisfy
gi(0) = 0. The slope of the maximal tangent ray from the origin is Ai. The point of
tangency is ^ Zi. The margin of adjustment is the number of units operated, which is
variable. The capital stock KI can be split over businesses through mergers, acquisitions,
and spin-os. All production units that are operated will have the same KI. This KI will
depend upon the relative prices of the three inputs. Production units of type i will be
operated at level ^ Zi and produce gi( ^ Zi).
29Appendix C. Deriving Total Factor Productivities
Here we describe how we derive sequences for the sectoral TFPs needed to compute equi-
librium paths for our extended model.
We start with observables.14 We have sequences for all total measured tangible in-
vestment xmt, measured business tangible xbt, and measured non-business tangible  xnt.
We have sequences for total business hours h1
t +h2
t and non-business hours  hnt. Let ymt be
measured output (GDP), which is the sum of business output of nal goods and services
ybt and non-business output  ynt. We have sequences for all three of these output series.
Finally, we have series for consumption, assumed to be the sum of private and public
consumption, and for tax rates.
Now we are ready to use the model's equilibrium conditions to derive the two TFP
series, A1 and A2. We use (3:6) and (3:7) to infer the allocation of hours within the
business sector. Let yIt = qtxIt. Equating wage rates implies that
yIt =
(1   1   1)h2
t
(1   2   2)h1
t
ybt:
Given observables and fyItg, the sequences for kIt and qt are chosen to satisfy
yIt=qt + (1   I)kIt = kIt+1
qt(1=ct)[(1   )(1   ht + (1   pt)(1   dt)]=(1 + ct)
= (1=ct+1)=(1 + ct+1)
[qt+1((1   )(1   ht+1) + (1   pt+1)(1   dt+1))(1   T)
+ (1   pt+1)(1   dt+1)(1ybt+1 + 2yIt+1)=kIt+1]
given initial conditions for capital. Finally, we use the production technologies along with
outputs, capital stocks, and hours to determine the time series for TFPs.
14 For more details on how we construct the observable time series, see Appendix A.
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